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CAN GOD BE PRESENT IN THE LITURGY 
IN AN AGE OF DECONSTRUCTION? 
Graham Hughes 
The question of 'presence' inhabits, to about the same degree but in very 
different forms, both the presuppositions of Christian liturgical practice and 
post-modern, or more exactly, post-structuralist, discourse. 
On the one side, the discussion reaches back many centuries, perhap's 
initially surfacing as a discussion in the dispute between Paschasius 
Radbertus and Ratramnus of Corbie in the ninth century as to the mode of 
Christ's presence in the eucharist.1 For Protestants, with whom the eucharist 
or Sacrament of Holy Communion as they prefer to call it carries less 
importance, the notion of 'presence' finds a more diffused form as a 
'presence of God' inhabiting the entire liturgy. Though less clearly 
articulated, the idea (of 'presence') is here not less structurally or 
theologically important. 
On the other side, Jacques Derrida's 'deconstructive' strategy has from 
the outset been directed toward the presumption of 'presence' in western 
rationality - the assumption that the thinking subject is directly present to 
her or his thoughts, that he or she is thus present to him or her self and 
that in utterance there is a direct correlation between this mental presence of 
thought to itself and its expression in spoken language.2 
Perhaps not unexpectedly, given the fairly enclosed theatre within 
which liturgical theology attends to its work, there seems little engagement 
between these two discussions of 'presence'. On the other hand there seems 
to be a prima facie case for drawing them into conversation; or, any rate, for 
theology to give more sharply focussed attention to its understanding of 
'presence' in light of the 'deconstructive' critique. If 'presence' generally is 
now difficult or perhaps impossible to articulate, is it possible for theology to 
remain within these conceptualities? And how might that be done? How is 
r;,,d 'present' in worship? 
DECONSTRUCTION 
My own attempts hitherto to give an account of the 'presence' which is 
encountered or realised in the act of corporate worship have drawn more or 
less directly on aesthetic models - the well worn tracks that run between the 
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arts and religion. Of great importance to me in this, for something like a 
decade, has been a sentence from the Roman Catholic systematic theologian 
David Tracy, who draws a connection between the practice of the artist and 
the perception of fundamental truths: 
The difference between the artist and the rest of us is one of intense degree. not one of 
klnd.ll•e difference Is one where the Journey of lntenslncl' tlon ·" journey which most of 
us feM yet desire, shun ye t demnnd • Is really undertaken ... The sign of the artist mi\y 
well be" willingness to undergo (this) journey of intensiflcntlon Into pnrticularfty to the 
point where an originating sense for the fundamental questions and feelings that impel 
us all ... Is experlenced.3 
It is in the intensification of ordinary things, I have been inclined to say - the 
kind of walking which we recognise as processional, the embroidery of 
language which makes it into hymnody and prayer, gestures which are not 
just gesticulations - these ordinary things but enriched, intensified, changed 
or charged, which mediates this sense of 'difference' or 'otherness' which we 
call 'the presence of God'. 
There can be little doubt, I think, that this has been a distinctly 
'modernist' project. The supposition that there is a surface of ordinariness 
through which one may pass in order there to apprehend the of 
God rvit/Jin or under ordinariness has all the hallmarks of mid-century 
aesthetic aspirations. Introducing the collected writings of Paul Tillich on art 
and architecture, John Dillenberger writes : 'Expressionism originally 
referred to developments in Germany and France in which the natural, self-
contained finite world was rejected in favour of a view of the world in 
which depth and ultimacy were affirmed underneath the surface of 
reality .. .'4 In the ensuing volume Tillich himself confirms this point of 
view: 
I know the appearance and structure of a tree and its relation to the surrounding 
realities. Science can tell me volumes about every tree in this respect. But I do not know 
Its inner meaning, the way in which it expresses the power of being which is present in 
everything tha t is. But there Is a way of penetrating Into this hidden quality of the 
thing ft nd this Is the way of artistic t reatlon. All the arts penetrate Into the depths of 
things which are beyond the reach of cognltion.S 
There is an unmistakable family resemblance between 'art which is 
achieved by the "journey of intensification"', 'a way of penetrating the inner 
meaning of things', and worship which finds God in 'the intensification of 
ordinariness'. Moreover, they belong to approximately the same generation: 
a sort of now-classic mid-century modernism: If we will go deep enough, we 
will encounter something approaching ultimacy.6 
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But we have come to another age; another generation now occupies 
the house. I think that at least three critical changes have been made which 
affect the notion of 'the presence of God' in the liturgy. These are: the 
collapsing of the relationship between surface and depth; the deconstruction 
of the 'self (as that which provides the possibility of apprehending an 
'other'); and the collapsing of 'reference' within signification. 
Whereas Tracy and Tillich saw surfaces as superficial and depth as 
desirable, the newer criticism has scattered to the four winds this confidence 
in depth and positively flaunts its exuberance in surfaces. In introducing a 
recent essay in a volume on Postmodernism and Religion, for example, 
Mark Taylor quotes from Jean Baudrillard's America: 
Why Is L.A., why are the deserts, so fascinating? It is because you are delivered from 
all depth there - a brilliant, mobile, superficial neutrality, a challenge to meaning and 
profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an outer hyperspace, with no origin, no 
reference points ... The fascination of the desert: immobility without desire. Of Los 
Angeles: insane circulation without desire. The end of aesthetics? 
Among his many deconstructions, Derrida too has subverted the 
opposition between surface and depth or, its near equivalent, between inside 
and outside. Writing of what he regards as Foucault's ironical undertaking 
(in writing reasonably about madness) and punning (as always) on 
Foucault's 'scission' (decision) whereby rationality was able to define and 
then exclude madness, he says: 'As always, the dissension is internal. The 
exterior [is] the interior, is the fission that produces and divides it along the 
lines of the Hegelian Entzweiung [dissension].B Or one thinks here of 
Derrida's widely cited reflection on the status of the frame, the 'parergon', 
which belongs both to the painting and to the world beyond the painting, 
and in this sense belongs properly neither to one nor the other?9 
This reference to the deconstruction of the distinctions between 
surface and depth or inside and outside leads us directly to a second element 
in the 'post-' program which impacts directly on the question of liturgical 
presence: namely the systematic subversion of all antitheses or dualities. 
Perhaps the most characteristic move of deconstruction has been to show 
that nothing has its identity separately from that which is different from it, 
separately, that is, from that which allows the differences between them to 
be identifiable; so that the hidden trace of otherness infuses all identity. This 
becomes especially pertinent when we come to speak the identity of selves 
in relation to others, either other human beings or, in our case, the 
otherness of God. As innumerable commentators have observed, the 
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cartesian cogito has been a kind of Magna Carta for 'modern' sensibility, 
bringing together as it does the long history of logocentrism (the elevation 
of rationality - i.e., placing it beyond inquiry - to be that by which all other 
Inquiry is determined) and identity (the rationalist tendency to find 
similarities rather than differences). The postulate of the self as an entity 
fully present to itself became, in the cogito, the touchstone for all other 
forms of inquiry. Postmodern or deconstructive criticism, however, has 
been brought to bear on this foundational assumption from so many 
directions (Lacanian psychology, Derridean textual studies, Foucault's 
studies of the transmission of power) that it is now apparent not only that 
the self of the cartesian cogito is a social construction but is one fraught with 
dangerous potentiaJ.IO Returning to our question, then, it takes only 
minimal reflection to see that the deconstruction of the autonomous ego 
implicates the objectivity of that which is other than me. In other words, to 
have some confidence that it is God I am encountering, I need to be pretty 
certain that is not simply a projection of myself. But if the identity of the self 
(the presence of the self to itself) is now rendered doubtful, so the objectivity 
of that which the self encounters as other must be equally ambiguous. 
This then leads us, thirdly, back to the matter of surface and depth, 
via the question of reference. Tillich and Tracy's confidence is that if one 
cares to penetrate the surface of things, there is a depth, there will be a 
disclosure of how things really are. There is something to which the signs 
ultimately point. Postmodernism has relinquished any such supposition. In 
deconstruction all we can know about is the endless chain of signs which are 
distinguishable precisely in their difference and deferral: 
... there has never been any thing but writing; there have never been anything but 
supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of 
differential references, the 'real' supervening and being added only while taking on 
meaning from a trace and from an Invocation of the supplement, etc.! I 
Needless to say, liturgical practice has from the beginning assumed 
that the sign points beyond itself to an other, intangible yet real; that the sign 
stands for, re-presents, makes present a real presence. It can hardly be more 
apparent, then, that a representation of reality which sees only the endless 
play of differences, sets pretty profound challenges for liturgical theory as it 
has traditionally understood itself. 
We shall see that the way forward which most deconstructive 
theologians have taken is that of exploiting the unfinality of the signs - that 
absence which remains when signification is exhausted, what Taylor calls 'a 
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non-absent absence' .t2 How easy it might be to carry this phenomenology 
across to liturgical praxis remains to be seen. 
QUESTIONS 
To the best of my knowledge there is no significant interest among liturgical 
theologians in the matters I have raised. The technical study of liturgy is 
almost wholly absorbed in antiquities or, at best, more contemporary 
historical studies. Where, very occasionally, what might loosely be called the 
theory or theology of worship is probed, practically invariably, I will say, the 
Christian conventions and convictions with respect to 'God' and 'God's 
presence' are presumed from the outset. I have also said that circumstance 
seems to me to be lamentable for several reasons; not the least of which is 
that insofar as a worship service consists in a construction of signs, a theory 
which seems so centrally to the nature of signs and signification as does 
deconstruction can scarcely be left out of consideration. 
In beginning to think through these issues, I want first to pose some 
questions toward post-modernist reflection from the point of view of 
situating Christian worship in this scene. Then I want to make some 
recuperative suggestions. The first question has to do with the public, i.e., 
corporate, nature of worship. One repeatedly gains the impression that those 
who think about the religious dimensions and possibilities within 
deconstruction, do so from within a privatising, individualistic perspective. 
Words such as 'pure alterity', 'silence', 'absence', or 'negation' abound. As 
Kevin Hart observes, citing Derrida: 'The most that deconstruction can do is 
glimpse "the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure".'t3 There is 
much talk of mysticism and of the via negativa (of which Hart's book is a 
luminous example). Moreover, with the more or less singular exception of 
Taylor's interest in art and architecture, deconstructive theology preoccupies 
itself practically exclusively with texts and textuality - that is, with the silent, 
inward contemplation of words on a page. 'Silence', 'unnameable glimmer' 
and 'non-absent absence' seem to offer little scope for the necessarily 
communal actions of a liturgical assembly. 
One dimension does seem accessible. In the essay of his which I have 
mostly cited, Taylor explores his thesis of a 'non-absent absence' particularly 
through the paintings of Anselm Keifer.14 It is not difficult to envisage the 
religious power that works such as Keifer's, hung in a worship space, could, 
would have for the gathered congregation. This said, a great deal more is 
expected to happen in an act of worship than the silent contemplation of 
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artefacts. So that the question about the corporate aspects of a deconstructive 
understanding of God's presence in worship returns. 
A second question seems to arise from the customary cursus of 
deconstructionist studies: 'absence', 'silence', and so on: is there room in 
deconstruction only for negation? And is this a sufficiently fulsome 
curriculum for a congregation's worship? Worship, one hopes, leads to an 
enhancement, an enrichment of people's lives, an enabling of them to live 
more vibrantly and confidently. From this point of view we may recall that 
Roland Barthes' jouissance was as much an originating element of 
deconstruction as was Derridean 'play'715 Still, even where deconstruction 
does not explicitly own to nihilism, there seems a consistent tendency 
toward negation and denial: 
My question here, chieny to Taylor but to some extent also to Derrida, is to do with 
the pnlhos of this model, the pathos of the 'veiled truth, of a diurnal or primitive 
perception In need of dismantling. A string uf dualisms opens up in the background: the 
Intelligible and the mysterious, speech and silence, the Inside and the outside, the 
app;uent and the real, the speaking ego and the speechless void, even - dare I evoke it 
- spirit and nature. The sacred, the liberative, is here the second set of terms - the 
lneHal> le, the ou tst.Je, the e ternal. My anxiety is to do with the relega tion to 
of the temporal, the communicative, the Implied devaluation of 'exchange' .. .. 6 
My third question has to do more with the site than the content of a 
deconstructionist liturgical theology; the question is occasioned by the fact 
that the arena is ordinarily occupied by literary, philosophical and cultural 
practitioners. I mean that a 'theology of presence' formed in some degree of 
accountability to post-modernism has to be thought through not on the 
basis of artefacts in museums of contemporary art or with reference to the 
poetry of Baudelaire. I do not mean at all in this that a cleft must be riven 
between 'culture' and the 'people' , that the artefacts which find a place in 
galleries have nothing whatsoever to do with the lives people are living in 
the western suburbs of Sydney where I live. I mean that the subject matter of 
a deconstructionist theory of the 'presence of God' must be truly demotic, 
must be fashioned of those materials with which people in congregations of 
worshipping people construct their lives, in precisely the way in which 
academics construct their conceptual lives out of texts and art and literature. 
RECONSTRUCTION 
As I have observed, deconstruction is essentially an 'hermeneutics of 
suspicion'. It lives by exposing hidden inconsistencies and complacencies. Its 
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value lies in showing us the cracks and fissures in what we thought was 
intact, the margins of what we had supposed would run forever.l7 Any 
ostensible rapprochement between liturgy and deconstruction will thus 
need to be more than vigilant that it does not take back to itself precisely that 
which deconstruction would have exposed as dubious and spurious. 
Theologians might know, but seem often not to know, the wonderful 
dexterity of our own sleight of hand. 
I have listed some of my questions. Beyond these, however, I think 
there are undoubtedly some critical contributions which a deconstructionist 
approach can make to a reflection on liturgy and 'the presence of God'. The 
first I take to be of inestimable importance. The most central tenet of 
deconstruction, I say again, is that the chains of human signification are 
endlessly recursive: there is no last word, or first word, or point of access 
outside our own signifying systems. God is forever clothed in differance. 
Anyone therefore who observes a congregation singing its heart out, 
but in so doing showing all the secret or not so secret signs that they love the 
words or the words and music but have practically no attention at all for 
that to which the words and music point; anyone who observes charismatics 
or other enthusiasts lost in their adoration of the experience itself; anyone 
who observes presiders reciting words and miming gestures in purely 
mechanical ways; anyone who watches a procession 'process', the members 
of which are variously interested in who is or isn't in the congregation, or 
how their robes appear, or why the organist cannot seem to keep a proper 
beat; anyone, that is, who attends and observes most parish congregations at 
their worship, understands the need and importance in liturgical reflection 
and praxis of deconstruction. In practically every place one goes, 'God' in 
Christian worship has been domesticated, is known, is familiar. There is 
scarcely any perception that God is 'other', that God is, as deconstruction 
urges upon us, wholly enfolded in differance. 
Mark Taylor speaks of the temptation in painting to an inversion in 
which 'the secular becomes sacred', 'the love of image that mistakes [the 
image] for the real or absolute'.IB This temptation, actually this endemic 
tendency, is scarcely unknown to worship and to worshippers. But to be 
reminded of it as insistently and as provocatively as deconstruction does is 
an inestimable service. 
A second contribution which is perhaps to be found in deconstruction 
is its insistence that this 'difference' is embedded witltin likeness or 
similarity or identity. I have said that worship in practically all the churches 
has achieved an unpromising familiarity with ' r r,d'; God is an other, not all 
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that different from all the other others whom we know and can identify. 
But equally, perhaps paradoxically, this 'other', known, recognisable, 
determinable, is also made a detachable other among the others. So that 
there is little inclination to recognise the surprising difference of God in tire 
familiarity of the ordinary world. 
In contradistinction, I think of the profound impact made on me by 
Noel Rowe's reading of his paper (to the best of my knowledge not ever 
published)19 on Francis Webb's 'Harry'20 and his (Noel Rowe's) insistence 
that the mongol Harry's letter to the 'house of no known address' is 
precisely a manifestation of 'the Word unwritten' . Or, in more gentle vein, I 
think of Kevin Hart's 'The Gift': 
Impossible to tell, now, given 
And what was not: slivers of rain on the window, 
Those gold-tooled Oeuvres of Dlderot on the shelf; 
The strawberry dreaming in a champagne nute --
Were they part of the gift or else? 
Or is the gilt still coming, on its way? 
The work of the liturgy oscillates between ordinariness and 
difference; it represents itself as a 'coming into' and a 'going out from' the 
presence of God. That presence, that difference, has to be sensibly, discernibly 
different from the ordinariness of ordinary lives, otherwise we are left with 
what John Milbank calls the secularising of the secular,22 the apotheosis of 
ordinariness. At the same time, in all this there is no departure from this 
world; it is here in ordinariness that this difference must be located. 
Logistical, practical questions about how the liturgy may effect this 
disclosure of difference in ordinariness, this play of sacrality in secularity, 
doubtless present themselves as a heavy tax on the imagination of priests, 
presiders, planners and participants. But that the liturgy might function as 
does a poet (such as Francis Webb) or a critic (such as Noel Rowe) seems to 
me to be possible. 
A final reflection returns to the question of the subjectivity of selves 
and its implications for encountering the 'otherness' of God. Deconstruction 
or post-modernism, I said, has set itself to undercut wherever it can, the 
'illusion of self-consciousness'.23 There can now be no doubt, I suppose, that 
the self which is our knowledge of ourselves is both divided and the 
product of social constraints. For all this, it is still hard to relinquish the 
sense that each of us has a unique personal history, that we think and feel 
and react differently from every other human being and that there is, 
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therefore, some partial sense of identity, even where this is confessedly 
located in the amalgam of difference-from-and-dependence-on others . 
There are critics who, while espousing a general post-modernist position, 
believe that it is possible to maintain a qualified theory of the self.24 
It seems to me possible, then, given a residual theory of the self; that 
the selves of worshippers may in fact be enhanced in the event of 
encountering the sort of difference which I said earlier is a crucial 
desideratum for liturgical experience. The 'illusion of self-consciousness' 
leads us to suppose that we can itemise, catalogue, account for all otherness; 
but an otherness that locates, confronts and challenges my self - as the 
liturgy hopefully might - seems to me to offer more than an 
undifferentiated play of ordinariness, the dazzling (but perhaps in the end 
unilluminating) so-called 'secular' world. 
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